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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past two decades, the tension between the First Amendment's
free speech guarantee' and harassment policies has been the subject of
much commentary. This tension is particularly strong in the university
setting.2 On the one hand, universities are seen as beacons of free
thought and the exchange of ideas. On the other hand, universities have
a duty to protect their students from harassment, which could interfere
with a student's right to participate fully in the learning environment. In
fact, courts have indicated that a university can be legally liable for
student-on-student sexual harassment under Title IX if the university
knows about the harassment and fails to take any action.
1. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in relevant part,
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech ... U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The First Amendment has limits, however; the free speech clause does not
protect certain categories of speech, such as defamation and obscenity. Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245-46 (2002).
2. See generally Anita Cava & Beverly Earle, The Collision ofRights and a Search
for Limits: Free Speech in the Academy and Freedom from Sexual Harassment on
Campus, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282 (1997) (examining the conflict between the
First Amendment and university sexual harassment policies as applied to faculty); Joshua
S. Press, Comment, Teachers, Leave Those Kids Alone? On Free Speech and Shouting
Fiery Epithets in a Crowded Dormitory, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 987 (2008) (discussing the
history of campus hate speech policies and suggesting that campus-wide anti-harassment
policies are unconstitutional, but proposing that policies applicable only to dormitories
would comply with the First Amendment).
3. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999)
(holding that a school may be liable for damages in a private action under Title IX
"where the funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference to known acts of
harassment in its programs or activities" and the sexual harassment is "so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim's access to an
educational opportunity or benefit"); Williams v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga.,
477 F.3d 1282, 1294-99 (11th Cir. 2007); see generally Karen E. Edmonson, Comment,
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Courts have also held, however, that several universities'
harassment policies violated students' First Amendment freedom-of-
speech rights.4 The Supreme Court has not yet addressed this tension,
and few federal courts of appeals have ruled on the issue.5 In the recent
case DeJohn v. Temple University,6 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit struck down Temple University's sexual harassment policy,
finding that the policy was overly broad and prohibited speech protected
by the First Amendment.
The legal fragility of university sexual harassment policies leaves
administrators and university attorneys between the proverbial rock and a
hard place. If they prohibit too little harmful speech, the university
potentially could be liable for sex-based discrimination under Title IX.8
If they prohibit too much speech, the relevant policy will almost certainly
be challenged and invalidated under the First Amendment. In light of the
Third Circuit's recent ruling in DeJohn v. Temple University, the middle
ground between these two extremes appears to be rapidly shrinking.
This Comment discusses how the DeJohn case affects the viability
of sexual harassment policies for public universities within the Third
Circuit. Part II of this Comment discusses the relevant history of free
speech doctrine in educational settings. The Comment begins, in Part
II.A, with a discussion of the Supreme Court's four landmark cases
dealing with public school speech restrictions. Part II.B examines Third
Circuit precedents on school speech policies. Part II.C examines a case
in which the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied the
overbreadth doctrine to a university's racial and ethnic harassment
policy.
Part III consists of an in-depth analysis of the DeJohn case. Part
III.A discusses the criteria set forth in the DeJohn opinion for
determining whether a harassment policy is facially constitutional. Part
III.B notes several issues that the DeJohn court did not address.
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education Goes to College: Holding Post-Secondary
Institutions Liable Under Title IX For Peer Sexual Harassment, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1203 (2000).
4. See generally Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995);
U.W.M. Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D.
Wis. 1991); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
5. See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
6. 537 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2008).
7. Id. at 320. The overbreadth doctrine is an exception to traditional rules of
standing in cases involving laws that restrict First Amendment rights. Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-13 (1973). "The overbreadth doctrine prohibits the
Government from banning unprotected speech if a substantial amount of protected speech
is prohibited or chilled in the process." Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255
(2002).
8. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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Finally, Part IV proposes a model sexual harassment policy that
would likely withstand First Amendment scrutiny while still protecting
an institution's interest in maintaining a harassment-free environment
that is conducive to learning.
II. CASE HISTORY OF HARASSMENT POLICIES IN EDUCATIONAL
SETTINGS
A. The Supreme Court's Jurisprudence on Free Speech in Public
Elementary and Secondary Schools
The constitutionality of speech prohibitions in public elementary
and secondary schools has often been the subject of litigation. Beginning
in 1969, the Supreme Court issued a series of opinions that created
standards to determine whether a school's restrictions on student speech
are permissible under the First Amendment.9  Although notable
differences exist between a public elementary or secondary school
environment and a higher education setting,10 these cases provide a
helpful starting point for analyzing university speech restrictions.
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
the Court addressed a school district policy that prohibited students from
wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam War.12 The Supreme Court
held that the policy impermissibly infringed upon students'
constitutionally protected freedom of speech.' 3  Following the Fifth
Circuit's analysis in Burnside v. Byars,14 the Court noted that student
speech could not be restricted unless the prohibited speech or conduct
would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.""
9. See generally Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
(1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
10. Most importantly, most university students are legally adults, whereas most
elementary and secondary school students are minors. School teachers and
administrators could be viewed as acting in the place of a minor's parents while the
minor is in school, DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 315, but that idea arguably would not apply to
university administrators. See Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 138-40 (3d Cir.
1979). Another difference is that at the elementary and secondary school level,
attendance is compulsory, but at the university level, attendance is voluntary.
11. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
12. Id. at 504.
13. Id. at 514.
14. 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
15. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (quoting Burnside, 363 F.2d at 749).
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The Court revisited the issue of a public school's ability to prohibit
student speech in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser. 6  Bethel
High School, guided by the Tinker standard, had adopted a policy stating
that "[c]onduct which materially and substantially interferes with the
educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane
language or gestures."l 7 School officials applied the policy to discipline
a student who gave a sexually explicit speech at an assembly where
students nominated their classmates for student government positions.' 8
Reversing the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,' 9 the
Supreme Court held that the actions of the school administrators did not
infringe on the student's constitutional rights.2 0 Important to the Court's
determination was the fact that, unlike in Tinker, the student speech at
issue in Fraser was not related to a political viewpoint. 2 1 The Court in
Fraser ruled that public schools could constitutionally prohibit lewd or
indecent speech.22
Two years after deciding the Fraser case, the Court again addressed
a First Amendment challenge to a student speech restriction in
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.23 In Kuhlmeier, a high school
principal deleted two pages from the school newspaper because he was
concerned about both the content of the articles and the privacy interests
of the people discussed in the articles.24
The Court distinguished this case from Tinker by holding that
although schools cannot prohibit protected speech, a school is not
necessarily required to promote student speech by allowing students to
use the school's name and resources.25  Schools may control student
speech in school-sponsored publications and broadcasts as long as the
censorship is "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."2 6
16. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
17. Id. at 678.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 687.
20. Id. at 685.
21. Bethel School District No. 403, 478 U.S. at 685.
22. Id.
23. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
24. Id. at 263-64. The two articles in question concerned teen pregnancy and
divorce. Id. Although the parties' names were changed, the individuals were still
identifiable by the details included in the article. Id. at 263, 274.
25. Id. at 272-73.
26. Id. at 274. The Court stated that it did not decide whether the same standard
applied at the post-secondary level. Id. at 273, n. 7. The Court later refined the
Kuhlmeier standard and applied it to universities in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). In Rosenberger, the Court ruled that a
public university could not deny funding to a student-run publication on the basis of the
viewpoints expressed therein when it was clear that the publication was independent of
2009] 371
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The Supreme Court most recently reviewed a school speech
restriction in Morse v. Frederick.27 In Frederick, several students
unfurled a banner displaying the words "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" while at
a school-sponsored event.28 A school policy prohibited students from
advocating the use of illegal substances. 2 9  Applying the policy, the
principal told the students to take down the banner.30 When one student
refused, the principal suspended him from school.
Relying largely on the Fraser opinion,32 the Court held that the
principal had not violated the student's First Amendment rights.33 The
Court found that the principal's actions were justified by the school's
legitimate interest in preventing student drug use and quelling peer
pressure.34 The Court stated its holding in Frederick narrowly,
permitting restrictions on student "speech that can reasonably be
regarded as encouraging illegal drug use."35
The Supreme Court's school speech opinions indicate that while
elementary and secondary school students certainly have First
Amendment rights, those rights are limited. Students cannot invoke the
First Amendment as a means to interfere with the rights of others36 or
with the educational mission of a school. Arguably, these same
principles should apply to university students as well.
B. Third Circuit Case Law on School Speech Policies
Prior to its recent decision in DeJohn v. Temple University,3 7 the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had also issued two important
opinions regarding school harassment policies. The first important Third
Circuit precedent is Saxe v. State College Area School District;38 the
second is Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Regional Board of Education.3 9
The Third Circuit relied on these cases, along with the four Supreme
the university and the views expressed were the views of private speakers. See id. at 834-
37.
27. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
28. Id. at 397.
29. Id. at 398. The policy stated: "The Board specifically prohibits any assembly to
public expression that . .. advocates the use of substances that are illegal to minors .... "
Id. (omissions in original).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. at 404-05, 409.
33. Id. at 397.
34. Id. at 407-08.
35. Id. at 397.
36. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
37. 537 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2008).
38. 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
39. 307 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2002).
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Court school speech cases, in its analysis of Temple University's sexual
harassment policy in DeJohn.4 0
In Saxe, the court determined that the State College Area School
District's ("SCASD") harassment policy was unconstitutional because it
was overly broad and prohibited speech that did not fit within the Tinker,
Fraser, or Kuhlmeier standards. 4 1 The Saxe court quickly struck down a
portion of the policy which defined harassment as "verbal ... conduct
which offends . .. an individual .. . because of [inter alia, 'religion . . . or
other personal characteristics']."4 2 Citing Tinker, the court noted that a
school cannot prohibit speech merely because the speech is
uncomfortable or offensive.4 3
The court then determined that, in the narrowest possible reading,
the policy defined harassing speech as speech meeting the following
elements: "(1) verbal ... conduct (2) that is based on one's actual or
perceived personal characteristics and (3) that has the purpose or effect
of either (3a) substantially interfering with a student's educational
performance or (3b) creating an intimidating[,] hostile, or offensive
environment."4
The court found that even this narrow reading of the policy
prohibited speech that was not lewd, not school-sponsored, and did not
create a substantial risk of disruption.45
The court was particularly concerned that the policy prohibited
speech that had "the purpose ... of. . . substantially interfering with a
student's educational performance" and did not require a showing of an
actual substantial interference.46
The court also took issue with the "intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment" element, finding that it too prohibited protected speech.47
The court seemed to suggest two ways in which SCASD could possibly
bring this final element of the policy into compliance with the First
Amendment. First, SCASD could limit the scope of the policy to
prohibit only speech that would result in liability to the school under
federal discrimination laws, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools 4 8 and Davis v. Monroe
40. See, e.g., DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 315, 317.
41. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 216-17.
42. Id. at 215.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 216.
45. Id.
46. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 216-17.
47. Id. at 217.
48. 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (holding that money damages are an appropriate remedy
in a Title IX suit against a school for sex-based discrimination).
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County Board of Education.4 9  Second, SCASD could modify the
"hostile environment" prong to "require a threshold showing of severity
or pervasiveness. "5 Because the SCASD policy in question contained
neither of these limitations, the court held that the policy was
unconstitutionally overbroad.5 1
One year later, the Third Circuit reviewed another school
harassment policy in Sypniewski.5 2 This time, the court upheld all but
one provision of the school district's harassment policy. 53 The court held
that a prohibition of speech that "creates ill will" was overly broad
because it encompassed speech that merely offended the listener.5 4 In
upholding the remainder of the policy, including prohibitions of speech
that is "racially divisive" or "creates . . . hatred," the court focused on the
school district's history of disruptive racial incidents. 5 The district had
adopted the policy in response to serious racial tensions and related
disruptive acts in the school district.56 However, the court noted that in a
different district without such a background, the same policy might be
unconstitutionally overbroad.s? The court's analysis rested on Tinker's
"substantial disruption" standard: because racially motivated speech
previously caused substantial disruptions in the district, the Board could
reasonably believe that similar speech would cause substantial
disruptions in the future.58
Saxe and Sypniewski revealed that the Third Circuit saw little space
between the prohibitions of Title IX and the requirements of the First
Amendment. Saxe in particular implied that the minimum standard for
liability under Title IX and the maximum constitutionally permissible
level of student speech restriction might be one and the same. 5 9 Even so,
Sypniewski showed that the court was willing to look to the individual
circumstances necessitating a harassment policy for a particular school.
49. 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (holding that a school may be liable for damages in a
private action "where the funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference to known
acts of harassment in its programs or activities" and the harassment is "so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim's access to an
educational opportunity or benefit"). See Saxe, 240 F.3d at 217.
50. See id. at 217.
5 1. Id.
52. See generally Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg'I Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243 (3d
Cir. 2002).
53. Id. at 265.
54. Id. at 264-65.
55. Id. at 262, 265-66.
56. Id. at 247-49.
57. Sypniewski, 307 F.3d at 265.
58. Id. at 262.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49. DeJohn seems to further this
conclusion. See infra text accompanying notes 90-91.
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C. Harassment Policies in the University Setting: The Sixth Circuit's
Approach
Several federal district courts have wrangled with the question of
how the rules surrounding elementary and secondary school speech
restrictions should be applied in a university setting.o Prior to DeJohn,
however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was the only federal
appellate court to examine the constitutionality of a university
harassment policy.
In Dambrot v. Central Michigan University,6' the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Central Michigan University's
racial and ethnic harassment policy was overbroad and facially
unconstitutional. 62 The policy prohibited racial and ethnic harassment,
which it defined as:
any intentional, unintentional, physical, verbal or nonverbal behavior
that subjects an individual to an intimidating, hostile or offensive
educational, employment or living environment by ... (c) demeaning
or slurring individuals through. . . written literature because of their
racial or ethnic affiliation; or (d) using symbols, [epithets] or slogans
that infer negative connotations about the individual's racial or ethnic
affiliation. 63
The court held that this definition prohibited "a substantial amount of
constitutionally-protected speech."6 4 The policy contained a limiting
provision that stated, "[t]he University will not extend its application of
discriminatory harassment so far as to interfere impermissibly with
individuals['] rights to free speech."65 The court concluded that this
provision was not enough to save the policy because it was still possible
for the University to violate students' freedom of speech unintentionally
under the policy.66 The court also found that the policy could not be
sustained as a prohibition of "fighting words" 67 because it only
60. See generally UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774
F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich.
1989).
61. 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995).
62. Id. at 1182.
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting Leonardson v. City of East Lansing, 896 F.2d 190, 195 (6th Cir.
1990)).
65. Id. at 1183.
66. Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1183.
67. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (stating that
certain classes of speech, including "fighting words-those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace," are not protected by the
First Amendment).
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prohibited "fighting words" related to race or ethnicity, which constituted
content discrimination.
The Sixth Circuit did not address the Supreme Court's school
speech jurisprudence at all when it analyzed Central Michigan
University's policy.69  Rather, the Dambrot court invalidated CMU's
harassment policy based primarily on overbreadth doctrine. 70  The
Dambrot court treated universities more like municipalities than like
public schools. This approach is different from the analysis that the
Third Circuit later utilized in DeJohn.1  The Dambrot court did not
discuss a university's interest in preventing harassment or students' right
to participate in educational activities; rather, the court focused entirely
on employees' and students' freedom of speech.7 2 This approach fails to
recognize the unique status of universities and the many competing rights
and interests that converge in a higher education setting.
III. ANALYZING DEJOHN V. TEMPLE UNIVERSITY
DeJohn v. Temple University74 provided the Third Circuit an
opportunity to address, for the first time, the intersection of university
harassment policies and freedom of speech. The plaintiff in the case, a
former Temple University graduate student, claimed that Temple's
sexual harassment policy was overly broad and facially
unconstitutional.75 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.76
The court did not, however, imply that a university could never
formulate a constitutional harassment policy.7 7  While the court found
68. Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1184-85 (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)).
The Dambrot court said that CMU's policy prohibited only those fighting words related
to an "individual's racial or ethnic affiliation," which "necessarily require[d] the
university to assess the racial or ethnic content of the speech." Id. at 1184.
69. This might be explained in part by the fact that CMU's policy had been applied
to discipline a coach rather than a student. See id. at 1180-81.
70. See id. at 1182-84 (citing, inter alia, Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 780, 801 (1984); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973)).
71. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
72. See generally Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1182-85.
73. See discussion infra Parts III-V.
74. 537 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2008).
75. Id. at 305.
76. Id. at 320.
77. In fact, the Third Circuit had said in Saxe, "[w]e do not suggest, of course, that
no application of anti-harassment law to expressive conduct can survive First
Amendment scrutiny. Certainly, preventing discrimination in the workplace-and in the
schools-is not only a legitimate, but a compelling, government interest." Saxe v. State
Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 2001). But see Press, supra note 2, at
989-90 ("[C]ourts have almost universally rejected campus speech policies. . . ."). While
technically true, this statement is misleading when one considers how few courts
(particularly appellate courts) have actually considered such policies.
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fault in several specific words and phrases within Temple's policy, the
court left some provisions untouched. Moreover, the court suggested
that universities may still prohibit categories of speech that traditionally
have not been protected by the First Amendment.7 9 Part III.A of this
Comment distills from the DeJohn opinion the criteria for creating a
constitutional university sexual harassment policy. Additionally, the
potential consequences of each criterion are discussed. Part III.B notes
several questions that the DeJohn court did not address and considers the
implications of those issues for universities striving to draft effective yet
constitutional sexual harassment policies.
A. Guidance from the Third Circuit: Criteria for Creating a
Constitutional University Sexual Harassment Policy
The DeJohn court could have invalidated Temple University's
sexual harassment policy upon finding that just one provision was overly
broad. Instead, the court chose to explain how several of the policy's
provisions prohibited protected speech.80  Although the additional
discussion was perhaps unnecessary to the outcome of the case, the
court's analysis provides helpful guidance for universities wishing to
avoid litigation over their own sexual harassment policies.
The DeJohn court built its analysis on the Supreme Court and Third
Circuit precedents regarding speech restrictions in elementary and
secondary schools. 81 One should initially note the court's warning that
when imposing restrictions on student speech, colleges and universities
have less constitutional leeway than elementary and secondary schools.82
However, despite repeatedly referencing this higher standard, the court
never set forth any test different from the judicially established tests for
elementary and secondary school settings. Rather, the court's analysis of
Temple's policy focused mostly on Tinker's substantial disruption test.83
1. The Speaker's Motives
First, the court stated that a university harassment policy could not
focus on the speaker's motives.84 The relevant portion of Temple's
policy prohibited "expressive, visual or physical conduct of a sexual or
gender-motivated nature ... [that] has the purpose or effect of
78. See infra text accompanying notes 109-114.
79. See DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 316, 320.
80. See discussion infra Parts III.A.1-6.
81. See, e.g., DeJohn, 557 F.3d at 317-18.
82. Id. at 318.
83. See, e.g., id. at 317 n.17.
84. Id. at 317.
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unreasonably interfering with an individual's work, educational
performance, or status; or has the purpose or effect of creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment."85 The court concluded
that speech intended by the speaker to create an unreasonable
interference or a hostile environment does not necessarily create such a
disruption. Therefore, the "purpose or effect" language of Temple's
policy prohibited speech that did not satisfy Tinker's substantial
disruption requirement.
The elimination of language describing a speaker's motive likely
will not lessen the effectiveness of a sexual harassment policy. A
university's goal in creating a sexual harassment policy is to protect an
individual's ability to learn and function comfortably and effectively in
the educational environment. Words that are spoken or written with a
malicious purpose do not interfere with this goal if they do not actually
disrupt the targeted individual's ability to participate fully in the
educational process. Therefore, this first limitation does not diminish the
value of sexual harassment policies.
2. Gender-Motivated Speech
Second, the court objected to the policy's prohibition of "gender-
motivated" speech, particularly when accompanied by the words
"hostile" and "offensive."88  The court noted that this provision was
broad enough to prohibit "'core' political and religious speech, such as
gender politics and sexual morality," which is protected by the First
Amendment. 89 The court suggested that a policy could prohibit "gender-
motivated" speech that creates a "hostile or offensive environment" only
if the policy required "a showing of severity or pervasiveness." 90 To
withstand First Amendment scrutiny, a policy prohibiting "gender-
motivated" speech must require "that the conduct [is so severe or
pervasive that it] objectively and subjectively creates a hostile
environment or substantially interferes with an individual's work."9'
These limitations will likely require a number of public universities
to substantially narrow the scope of their sexual harassment policies. It
is difficult to conceive of an effective sexual harassment policy that does
not include some reference to gender- or sex-motivated speech.
However, the court gave universities a choice to bring their policies into
85. Id. at 316.
86. DeJohn, 557 F.3d at 317.
87. Id. at 319.
88. Id. at 317-18.
89. Id. at 317.
90. Id. at 317-18.
91. DeJohn, 557 F.3d at 318.
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compliance with the First Amendment: either eliminate any reference to
gender- or sex-motivated speech or add a severity or pervasiveness
92 lterequirement. The latter would almost certainly be the more desirable
option.
Policies that require a showing of severity or pervasiveness will
inevitably allow some harmful verbal conduct to go unpunished. A
student who endures gender-motivated speech that "subjectively creates
a hostile environment" will have no recourse under such a policy unless
the student can also prove that the speech is so severe and pervasive that
it also objectively creates a hostile environment. 93  There may be
situations in which the speaker and the listener both clearly understand
that the speech is creating a hostile environment and interfering with the
listener's educational experience. However, an outsider, who does not
understand the relationship between the two parties or the particular
vulnerability of the listener, may not comprehend the devastating effect
of the speech. In such a situation, the victim could only prove the
existence of a subjectively hostile environment. The victim thus would
have no recourse under a policy that only prohibits speech that creates
both an objectively and subjectively hostile environment.
Nevertheless, many victims of harmful sex-based speech will likely
be able to show that the harassing speech both subjectively and
objectively creates a hostile environment. While the court's imposition
of a severity and pervasiveness requirement will leave victims of harmful
gender-motivated speech unprotected in some circumstances, the
requirement does not undermine sexual harassment policies altogether.
3. Speech that Unreasonably Interferes with an Individual's Work
Perhaps the DeJohn court's biggest assault on harassment policies
was its announcement that policies probably cannot constitutionally
prohibit speech or conduct that "unreasonably interfere[s] with an
individual's work." 9 4  The court concluded that even though
92. Again, there is no guarantee that the inclusion of a severity or pervasiveness
requirement would be enough to save a policy that proscribes gender-motivated speech.
See supra note 91.
93. See DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 317-18.
94. DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 319. Interestingly, in its discussion, the court quoted only
the first part of this clause. The full clause prohibited "expressive, visual or physical
conduct of a sexual or gender-motivate nature when ... such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work, educational performance, or
status." Id. at 316 (emphasis added). The court's omission suggests that the court would
uphold a prohibition on speech that interferes with an individual's educational
performance or status. The court did cite to its statement in Saxe that a policy "which
prohibits speech that would 'substantially interfer[e] with a student's educational
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"unreasonably" might encompass both an objective and a subjective
requirement, "it still does not necessarily follow that speech which
effects an unreasonable interference with an individual's work justifies
restricting another's First Amendment freedoms." 95  Initially, this
statement appears to conflict with the underlying premise of the Supreme
Court's ruling in Davis96 and the purpose of Title IX.97 However, the
court's later statements seem to indicate that, once again, a severity or
pervasiveness requirement would be sufficient to cure the problem.98
Yet it is difficult to reconcile the court's language with one of the
oft-referenced limitations of the Tinker opinion: speech that interferes
with the rights of others is not protected under the First Amendment.99
As the Supreme Court made clear in Davis, students have a right under
Title IX to be free from sexual harassment under any education program
receiving federal funds.' 00 It would seem, then, that "gender-motivated"
speech that "unreasonably interfere[s] with an individual's work" 01
should not be entitled to First Amendment protection. Although "a
person's work" is an ambiguous phrase,102 "a person's work" is surely
encompassed by Title IX's broad scope, which covers any federally
performance' may satisfy the Tinker standard ... Id. at 320 n.22 (quoting Saxe v. State
Coll. Area Sch. Dist, 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001)).
95. Id. at 319.
96. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650-51 (1999) ("[Title IX]
makes clear that .. . students must not be denied access to educational benefits and
opportunities on the basis of gender."). See supra note 49.
97. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000).
See infra notes 100-103 and accompanying text. The statement also squarely conflicts
with the EEOC's Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)
(2008), which provide that "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment
when ... such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment."
98. DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 320.
99. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508, 513
(1969) ("There is here no evidence whatever of... collision with the rights of other
students to be secure and to be let alone. . . . [T]his case does not concern speech or
action that intrudes upon .. . the rights of other students.... But conduct by the student,
in class or out of it, which for any reason-whether it stems from time, place, or type of
behavior-disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech." (emphasis added)).
100. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000); see generally Davis, 526 U.S. 629.
101. See DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 316.
102. See id. at 319. "Work" could refer to the work of an employee, a student's
work-study position, or even a student's coursework or research.
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funded "education program or activity."' 0 3 The DeJohn court's failure to
address this conflict leaves the issue ripe for argument in a future case.'0
4. Speech that Creates a Hostile or Offensive Environment
Additionally, the court objected to the phrase "hostile or offensive
environment."10 5  The court reasoned that such a broad phrase "could
encompass any speech that might simply be offensive to a listener," 10 6
but provided little further explanation for striking down this phrase. The
court did acknowledge elsewhere in the opinion that, according to the
Supreme Court, a student can sue a school for "hostile environment"
harassment under Title IX. 0 7 Presumably, then, the Third Circuit would
permit a prohibition of speech that creates a "hostile environment" but
not a prohibition of speech that creates a "hostile or offensive
environment."
While the court did not attempt to define either hostile or offensive,
one can infer from the Supreme Court's employment law jurisprudence
that "hostile environment" is a higher standard than "offensive
environment."' 0 8  Therefore, a policy that prohibits only "hostile
103. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000). "Program or activity" is defined as "all the
operations of... a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public
system of higher education." 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2000).
104. Of course, a court could find that Title IX itself unconstitutionally restricts free
speech. The conflict might not simply be between a statute and the First Amendment,
however. Even without Title IX, public schools and universities would be prohibited
from discriminating against students on the basis of sex by the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and subject to liability for discrimination under Section 1983.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92
F.3d 446, 453-58 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975); Mississippi University for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)). Furthermore, students have a "right[] ... to be secure
and to be let alone," Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1969), and hostile environment sexual harassment may interfere with that fundamental
right. See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006).
105. DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 320. The full clause prohibited speech that had the
"purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment." Id. at
316 (emphasis added). The court's omission of the word "intimidating" from its
discussion of the phrase suggests that universities can constitutionally prohibit speech
that creates an intimidating environment. Intimidating speech likely falls into the
category of verbal acts, which may not be entitled to First Amendment protection. See
generally John F. Wirenius, Actions as Words, Words as Actions: Sexual Harassment
Law, The First Amendment and Verbal Acts, 28 WHITTIER L. REv. 905 (2007) (noting
that the Supreme Court has long considered verbal acts to be outside the scope of the
First Amendment and proposing that verbal acts doctrine could resolve the tension
between the First Amendment and workplace sexual harassment law).
106. DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 320.
107. Id.at3l6n.14.
108. In the context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Supreme Court
has held that a "hostile or abusive work environment" does create an actionable claim for
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environment" harassment would perhaps proscribe less speech than a
policy that prohibits "hostile or offensive environment" harassment.
This substitution of phrases would narrow many university sexual
harassment policies somewhat, but it would not significantly interfere
with the goal of ensuring that students are not subjected to a hostile
living and learning environment.
5. Unwelcome Sexual Advances or Requests for Sexual Favors
One provision of Temple's sexual harassment policy that the
DeJohn court did not discuss was a clause prohibiting "an unwelcome
sexual advance or request for sexual favors."l 09 The court quoted this
clause as part of "the relevant portion" of the policy but made no
mention of the clause in its analysis.110 Presumably, then, a university
can still constitutionally prohibit a student from making unwelcome
sexual advances and requests for sexual favors.'"
6. Fighting Words
Finally, the DeJohn court summarily stated that "[c]ertainly speech
amounting to fighting wordsl 2 would not be protected.... Despite
the court's optimism, commentators have noted that today, the fighting
discrimination. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). However, the
Court has also said that 'mere utterance of an ... epithet which engenders offensive
feelings in an employee' does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to
implicate Title VII." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting
Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67). Title VII prohibits workplace discrimination "with
respect to [an employee's] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment" and makes it unlawful for an employer to "adversely affect [an employee's]
status as an employee" because of the employee's sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
Perhaps the DeJohn court implicitly relied on the Supreme Court's Title VII usage of the
terms "hostile" and "offensive." A number of courts have explicitly relied on Title VII
precedents in analyzing Title IX. See infra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
109. DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 316.
110. See id.
I11. The court likely did not address this clause because it considered such actions to
be clearly conduct rather than speech. The court said in Saxe that "non-expressive,
physically harassing conduct is entirely outside the ambit of the free speech clause."
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 206 (3d Cir. 2001). For a discussion of
the verbal acts doctrine and how it may apply to workplace harassment policies, see
generally Wirenius, supra note 105.
112. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (stating that
certain classes of speech, including "fighting words-those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace," are not protected by the
First Amendment).
113. DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 320 (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568).
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words doctrine is at best very narrow.1 4 Therefore, the fighting words
doctrine will provide little assistance to universities attempting to prevent
and address sexual harassment.
B. Open Questions: What DeJohn Did Not Address
While the DeJohn court provided some helpful guidance for
universities seeking to create constitutional harassment policies, the court
failed to address several important issues that affect the creation and
application of such policies. First, the DeJohn court did not discuss
whether the First Amendment applies differently to words spoken in
various physical and verbal contexts. Part III.B.1 argues that university
sexual harassment policies should treat harmful sex-based speech
differently according to the physical and verbal context in which the
speaker conveys the words. Second, the DeJohn court only discussed the
First Amendment standards for restrictions of student speech. Part
III.B.2 explains that different federal laws and constitutional standards
govern a university's treatment of its several major constituencies.
Because the court did not attempt to reconcile students' First
Amendment rights with a university's other obligations under Federal
Law, DeJohn exacerbated an existing double standard for the treatment
of students and employees in academia. Third, the DeJohn court
assumed without discussion that Temple University is a state actor and is
therefore bound by the First Amendment. Part III.B.3 briefly discusses
the First Amendment's state actor requirement and concludes that private
colleges and universities are not legally required to comply with DeJohn.
However, private universities should consider modifying their sexual
harassment policies to ensure free expression.
1. The Importance of Context
The sexual harassment policy at issue in DeJohn did not expressly
mention the context in which words are spoken;"' accordingly, the court
did not address the importance of context to restrictions on harassing
114. See Burton Caine, The Trouble with "Fighting Words": Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire is a Threat to First Amendment Values and Should Be Overruled, 88 MARQ.
L. REv. 441, 536 (2004) ("[T]he United States Supreme Court has never upheld a
conviction for fighting words in the sixty-two years since Chaplinsky[] and has protected
speech vastly more offensive than the mild protest in Chaplinsky. . . ."); see also id. at
553 ("Out of thirty-nine federal cases [decided between April 1996 and September 2001
concerning the fighting words doctrine], not one person was criminally convicted of a
speech-related offense."); Press, supra note 2, at 1007-08 ("In many of the instances
involving fighting words, modern courts simply strike down the ordinances as
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.").
115. See DeJohn, 537 F.3dat 316.
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speech. However, distinguishing varying contexts could play a crucial
role in reconciling the First Amendment, Title IX, and sexual harassment
policies. Noting that colleges are "marketplace[s] of ideas,"ll 6 the
DeJohn court declared that "[d]iscussion by adult students in a college
classroom should not be restricted.""' 7  Yet colleges are not merely
places where classes are held; for many students, a college campus is a
school, workplace, recreation facility, and home all in one. The
protections of the First Amendment should be strongest in the classroom,
in the context of intellectual debate."' 8 The First Amendment should not,
however, protect harassing statements that are made in a student's on-
campus home."' One commentator argues that dormitories should be
treated as nonpublic fora, where even content-based restrictions on
student speech are permissible.120 While the DeJohn opinion seemingly
requires very narrowly tailored campus-wide sexual harassment policies,
universities can likely impose stricter policies in residence halls and
other nonpublic spaces.
In addition to distinguishing various physical contexts, sexual
harassment policies should attempt to distinguish among verbal contexts
as well. The DeJohn court was concerned that Temple University's
harassment policy could prohibit 'core' political and religious speech,
such as gender politics and sexual morality."l21 The Supreme Court
readily distinguished the pure political expression in Tinker from the
nonpolitical, nonreligious, lewd speech in Fraser.122  In public
elementary and secondary schools, the former could not be restricted,123
116. Id. at 315 (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972)).
117. Id. at 315.
118. But see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13
(1969) ("[T]he principle of these cases is not confined to the supervised and ordained
discussion which takes place in the classroom.... When [a student] is in the cafeteria, or
on the playing field, or on the campus during authorized hours, he may express his
opinions ... if he does so without 'materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the ...
operation of the school' and without colliding with the rights of others." (quoting
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
119. In Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988), the Court held that a content-
neutral municipal ban on picketing outside of a residence did not unconstitutionally
restrict citizens' freedom of speech. The Court concluded that the government had a
substantial interest in protecting the sanctity of a person's home. Id. at 484 (citing Carey
v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)). The Court went on to say that "[t]here simply is no
right to force speech into the home of an unwilling listener." Id. at 485.
120. See Press, supra note 2, at 1021-28. For more about public forum analysis, see
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 677-80
(1992) (explaining, inter alia, that when government property is not a traditional public
forum and has not been opened to the public for the purpose of free expression, any
restriction of speech on that property must only be a reasonable restriction).
121. DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 317.
122. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
123. See generally Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
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but the latter could be prohibited.124 Therefore, universities may be able
to avoid overbreadth challenges by explicitly exempting speech about
political and religious views from their policies' definitions of sexual
harassment.125
2. A Double Standard: Students Versus Employees
Colleges and universities are unique in that members of their
communities often fill many roles. For instance, a student can also be an
employee and a tenant. The DeJohn court did not acknowledge these
overlapping roles. In fact, the court did not differentiate at all among
students, employees, and faculty members.
Fashioning a sexual harassment policy that will apply to all sectors
of the campus community is a challenging task. First, discrimination
against employees is primarily governed by Title VII,12 6 while
discrimination against students is governed by Title IX.12 7 While these
laws are similar in some respects, they are not the same.12 8 Many courts
have employed Title VII precedents to analyze Title IX issues,12 9 but
other courts have rejected this approach.'3 0 The DeJohn court added to
the double standard by objecting to Temple's prohibition of "hostile or
offensive environment" harassment,' 3' a phrase that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") uses in its definition of
sexual harassment for purposes of Title VII.132
124. See generally Fraser, 478 U.S. 675.
125. But see supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
126. See generally Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(2000).
127. See generally Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1681-1688 (2000).
128. Both acts prohibit sex-based discrimination, but the specific words used in the
two acts are not identical. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) with 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (2000). The Supreme Court has indicated that Title VII was intended to
compensate victims of employment discrimination, while Title IX was designed to
prevent discrimination. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287
(1998).
129. See, e.g., Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 695 (4th Cir. 2007); Nelson v.
Christian Bros. Univ., 226 F. App'x 448 (6th Cir. 2007).
130. See Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing
Gebser, 524 U.S. at284-86).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 105-108.
132. "Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when ... such conduct
has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."
EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2008).
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Second, a public university can exercise greater control over its
employees' speech than over speech by students.133 The Supreme Court
has said that a public employee's speech is only entitled to First
Amendment protection if the employee "spoke as a citizen on a matter of
public concern." 34 Even then, a public employer may impose "speech
restrictions that are necessary for [the] employer[] to operate efficiently
and effectively."' 35
The employee-student distinction becomes even more complicated
when considering the unique status of professors. The Supreme Court
has indicated the possibility that "expression related to academic
scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional
interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court's customary
employee-speech jurisprudence."l 36
Because of the varied standards for both harassment liability and
First Amendment protection, public universities may need to create
separate harassment policies for different sectors of their communities.
Creating, explaining, and enforcing multiple sexual harassment policies
will impose an additional burden on universities that previously relied on
one policy for the entire campus community.
3. The State Actor Requirement: Public Versus Private
Universities
Finally, it is worth noting that the First Amendment, applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits only state actors
from abridging the freedom of speech.137 Therefore, the constraints of
DeJohn and the Tinker line of cases do not apply to private colleges and
universities.13 8  However, private colleges and universities may invite
criticism if they choose not to revise their sexual harassment policies to
133. See generally Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
134. Id. at 418 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will
County, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)).
135. Id. at 419.
136. Id. at 425.
137. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
138. Private colleges and universities are not state actors based on the Supreme
Court's analysis of similar entities. See generally Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830
(1982) (holding that Plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her First
Amendment rights could not stand because Defendant private high school was not a state
actor despite the fact that it depended on public funds, was regulated by the State, and
performed a public function); see also Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121, 122-24
(6th Cir. 1971). The DeJohn court did not address the public/private distinction, likely
because Temple University regularly refers to itself as a public university and thus did
not question its status as a state actor. See Temple University, About Temple,
http://www.temple.edu/about/index.htm (2008).
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comply with First Amendment case law.1 39 Private colleges will have to
decide, based on their social climates and histories of harassment, how
broad or narrow their sexual harassment policies should be. In the
interest of promoting academic freedom, free expression, and discourse,
private colleges may be wise to make their policies no broader than
necessary to ensure a healthy learning environment.
IV. A POSSIBLE POST-DEJOHN UNIVERSITY SEXUAL HARASSMENT
POLICY
A. Introduction
The following policy is primarily designed to address harassing
speech by students in the wake of DeJohn. While it prohibits harassment
by employees as well, this policy might not be sufficient to comply with
the requirements of Title VII.14 0 Universities wishing to exercise greater
control over harassing speech by employees will need to create a
separate policy that applies only to employees.141 This sample policy
uses the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex as a starting point.142  Although the
EEOC is charged with enforcing Title VII rather than Title IX, the policy
at issue in DeJohn closely mirrored the EEOC Guidelines, and many
other universities have also used the Guidelines to construct their
policies.1 43 In addition, some language in the sample policy has been
borrowed from the definition of sexual harassment used by the
Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights.14 4
B. Sample Sexual Harassment Policy
All members of the campus community are prohibited from
engaging in sexual harassment. Sexual harassment includes both quid
pro quo and hostile environment harassment.
139. Indeed, the DeJohn case prompted a fervent new campaign by the Foundation
for Individual Rights in Education ("FIRE") against all campus speech codes. See
generally Press Release, FIRE, After Free Speech Victory in Federal Court, FIRE Sends
Warning to Public Universities Violating the First Amendment (September 30, 2008),
http://www.thefire.org/index.php/article/9744.html.
140. See supra notes 126-132 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 133-136 and accompanying text.
142. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)
(2008).
143. See Earle & Cava, supra note 2, at 306.
144. U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, Frequently Asked
Questions about Sexual Harassment, http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/qa-sex
harass.html (2008).
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Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when a person makes
"[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, [or] other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" 4 5 and:
(1) "submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or
implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment";146
(2) "submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is
used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual"; 147
(3) such conduct "causes a student to believe that he or she must
submit to unwelcome sexual conduct in order to participate in a school
program or activity";14 8 or
(4) the person is "an employee [and] causes a student to believe that
the employee will make an educational decision based on whether or not
the student submits to unwelcome sexual conduct." 4 9
Hostile environment sexual harassment occurs when a person makes
"[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature"'o or "on the basis of [the
listener's] sex"'"' and such conduct is so severe, persistent, or
pervasive1 5 2 that it substantially "interfer[es] with an individual's
[educational or] work performance or [objectively and subjectively]'"
creat[es] an intimidating, hostile," 54 or "abusive"'5 environment.
An expression of one's religious, "literary, artistic, political, or
scientific"l56 views regarding sex or gender, including topics such as
sexual morality or gender roles, does not, on its own, constitute sexual
harassment and is not prohibited by this policy.157




148. U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, Frequently Asked
Questions about Sexual Harassment, http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/qa-sex
harass.html (2008).
149. Id.
150. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)
(2008).
151. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
152. See supra notes 50, 90, and accompanying text.
153. See supra text accompanying note 91.
154. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)
(2008).
155. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). See supra note 108.
156. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 121-125.
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C. Additional Tools to Prevent and Address Harmful Speech on
University Campuses
The preceding Sample Policy attempts to address all of the DeJohn
court's concerns. It is a narrowly drawn policy, and some universities
may worry that it will not be adequate to prevent and penalize sexual
harassment. Universities should consider adopting other complementary
policies that can supplement the scope of the above sexual harassment
policy.
For instance, a policy prohibiting a student from engaging in
unwelcome, offensive speech or conduct in another student's on-campus
residence can protect the sanctity of each student's on-campus home.158
In addition, universities may be able to constitutionally prohibit speech
which is likely to substantially disrupt the operation and educational
mission of the university. 159 Universities may also be able to prohibit
lewd or indecent speech,16 0 particularly if such speech serves no
legitimate religious, political, artistic, scientific, or literary purpose.16 1
By combining a narrowly tailored sexual harassment policy with
additional policies that restrict particular kinds of verbal conduct in
particular situations, universities can likely maintain a relatively civil
living, learning, and working environment while staying within the
boundaries of the First Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
Although DeJohn v. Temple University is binding precedent only
for public universities in the Third Circuit, its effects will surely be felt
nationwide. Together with Dambrot v. Central Michigan University, the
DeJohn decision opened the door for students at other public universities
to challenge their schools' sexual harassment policies as overbroad and
unconstitutional. The conflict between students' First Amendment rights
and university harassment policies will likely continue to gain attention
due to the efforts of free speech advocacy groups.
While the DeJohn opinion may initially seem to signal the demise
of university harassment policies as applied to students, a careful reading
reveals that effective, constitutionally-permissible policies are still
possible. Although many public universities must now modify their
sexual harassment policies to comply with DeJohn, universities should
not eliminate their policies altogether. Carefully drafted sexual
158. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 15, 55-58.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 17-22.
161. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34, 36-37 (1973).
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harassment policies play an important role in establishing and
maintaining equilibrium among freedom of speech, equal protection,
freedom from sex-based discrimination, and the right to be left alone. To
fulfill their educational missions, universities must continue to search for
ways to balance the sometimes competing rights of their students.
Ideally, universities are places where ideas are developed, positions
are challenged, and intellectual fires are sparked. If the best kind of
learning and exchange is to occur, students must be free to convey their
thoughts openly. Sexual harassment prevents students from being fully
able to sit at the table and participate in the discussion. A truly free
exchange of ideas cannot occur coextensively with debilitating sexual
harassment. Resolving this paradox in a way that protects the rights of
all students will be a great but necessary challenge to universities-and
to courts.
